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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The global grain trade has always been of interest to 
economists because grain represents the single most 
important component of world food consumption.  It is 
one of the world’s key staple products, with about 12 
percent of production traded on world markets each year.  
The majority of previous studies on competition in the 
world grain trade have argued the market is imperfectly 
competitive.  For some markets (wheat, rice) the 
exporters have been found to hold market power (Kolstad 
and Burris [1986], Karp and Perloff [1989]), while others 
suggest the importers have the power to influence price 
(Love and Murniningtyas [1992], Sampson and Snape 
[1980]).  In some ways, these results are surprising.  How 
is it that price can be set different from marginal cost for 
a commodity produced around the world with ease of 
entry unless there are increasing returns to scale? 
This paper revisits the question of whether there is 
any evidence of imperfect competition in the grain trade, 
with a focus on wheat in Japan.  We allow for various 
possible forms of imperfect competition.  This question is 
currently important for at least two reasons.  Firstly, the 
new trade theory suggests there are possible strategic 
reasons for government intervention in international 
markets based on imperfect competition (Corden [1991]).  
Secondly, the market impacts of state trading agencies in 
grains are a priority item in the next round of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, and perhaps the 
biggest issue facing agricultural trade may be the 
competitive impacts of state trading enterprises in grains 
such as the Australian Wheat Board (AWB), the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), and the Japanese Food 
Agency (JFA) (Dixit and Josling [1997]).  Australia, 
Canada and Japan all use a government single-desk 
agency to control wheat trade.  Furthermore, Japan has 
consistently imported around 6.5 percent in value of the 
total wheat traded in international markets, procured 
totally by the United States, Canada, and Australia.   
In most previous studies on the grain trade, the 
Cournot non-cooperative oligopoly model with 
homogeneous products has typically been employed.   
Presumably, the quantity-setting assumption is more 
convenient than the alternative of price setting because 
imperfect competition in prices implies differentiated 
products, if the Bertrand paradox is to be avoided.   
Assuming for the moment that there exist oligopolistic 
international markets for some commodities, it is difficult 
to know, a priori, whether these markets are 
characterized by firms adopting a price- or a quantity-
setting strategy.  Theoretically, there are reasons to 
expect either type of behavior, depending on market and 
cost conditions.  For example, in some markets, such as 
the Japanese market, commodity imports may not 
necessarily be procured from the lowest cost supplier.   
Wolak and Kolstad [1991] examined Japanese imports of 
coal and argued that Japan imports from a variety of 
countries in order to diversify risk, and does not 
necessarily minimize the cost of imports.  If the Japanese 
“manage” imports and pre-determine quantities to be 
imported from each source, then exporting firms would IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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find it optimal to set prices rather than quantities (i.e., 
price is the strategic variable).  Alternatively, the use of 
price rather than quantity as the strategic variable might 
be determined by the nature of the commodity in question 
rather than the destination market.  Ceteris paribus, it 
might be expected that there would be price competition 
for commodities that can be stored at relatively low cost 
(e.g., rice, wheat and coal) because there is no reason that 
current production need be sold during the current 
period. 
In this paper we begin with the view that the wheat 
market may or may not be competitive.  If it is 
imperfectly competitive, we believe it may be 
characterized by either price or quantity competition.  We 
present a set of alternative theoretical models of the 
Japanese market for wheat imports in which account is 
taken of various forms of strategic interaction among 
Australian, Canadian and United States exporters.  We 
test for the type of strategic interaction that is most 
consistent with the data. 
Our analysis is conducted in two steps.  We first 
calculate the elasticity of the residual demand for 
Japanese wheat imports for each of three exporters, to 
determine whether there is any evidence of markup over 
marginal cost.  This allows us to narrow down the 
number of possible models.  Then, on the basis of a 
statistical test developed by Vuong [1989], we estimate 
which of the (remaining) competing models best fits the 
data.  
II.  ELASTICITY OF THE RESIDUAL DEMAND CURVE  
The degree of competition in a market is often expressed 
as the relative mark-up of price (p) over marginal cost 
(MC), i.e., as the Lerner Index () pM Cp ￿ .  In 
practice, it is usually nearly impossible to obtain data at 
the firm level on marginal costs or even prices in order to 
calculate the index.  In the present context, we would 
need to obtain price and marginal cost data for the two 
state trading enterprises (the AWB and the CWB) and for 
US firms which export to Japan.  Hence, the direct 
measurement of market power is not practicable. 
Following Bresnahan [1989], and Goldberg and 
Knetter [1999], we make use of the relationship between 
the Lerner Index and the elasticity of the residual inverse 
demand function faced by each exporting country.  At 
one extreme, this elasticity is zero when there is perfect 
competition and there is no mark-up over marginal cost; 
at the other, it coincides with the market demand 
elasticity of a monopolist and the mark-up is that of the 
monopolist.  In between these extreme cases, the residual 
inverse demand elasticity reflects that of an oligopoly.  In 
the latter case, the perceived residual inverse demand 
elasticity will depend upon the importing country’s 
inverse demand elasticity and the strategic interaction 
between exporting countries.  Hence, the elasticity of the 
residual inverse demand function is a practical way of 
measuring a country’s market power in a particular 
import market. 
For example, if the exporting country has no market 
power, then changes in its level of exports will not alter 
its export price and its residual inverse demand function 
will be horizontal.  Thus, if it is indicated by the data that 
this country’s price is determined by shifts in its 
competitors’ costs and not by its own quantity exported, 
then it has no market power.  Alternatively, if there is a 
negative relationship between quantity exported and 
price received, then there is market power.  However, the 
uniqueness of the relationship between the Lerner Index 
and the elasticity of the residual inverse demand function 
depends upon whether the actual and perceived functions 
coincide.  Baker and Bresnahan [1988] show that there is 
coincidence for the Stackelberg and dominant firm 
models.  In both models, the dominant firm takes account 
of the followers’ supply and, therefore, correctly 
perceives its residual inverse demand function.  Thus 
there is a direct relationship between the relative mark-
up, the elasticity and market power.  There is also a 
direct relationship when there is perfect competition and 
when there is substantial product differentiation 
(Goldberg and Knetter [1999, p. 39]).  In other forms of 
market structure, there is not a specific relationship 
between the relative mark-up and the residual inverse 
demand elasticity. 
Our approach to estimating the parameters of the 
residual demand function follows Goldberg and Knetter 
[1999].  Using this method, an inverse demand function 
for each exporting country is defined as a function of the 
total quantity of own exports, prices of each competing 
exporting country, as well as a vector of demand shifters 
in the destination market.  Using its inverse demand 
function, each exporting country simultaneously solves 
its profit maximization problem to generate an 
expression for its price defined as a function of its own 
exports, a vector of cost shifters in each of the competing 
exporting countries, and a vector of demand shifters in 
the destination market. The simultaneous solution of the 
maximization problem enables the elimination of the 
prices of the competing products from each implicit price 
expression.
1  
                                                 
1 This approach assumes that each country is a firm.  For 
the United States, where there is more than one firm 
exporting to Japan, we interpret the parameters as share-
weighted industry averages for all firms.  This enables us 
to transform the first-order conditions so as to be 
estimated with market level data without using 
implausible aggregation assumptions. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Goldberg and Knetter are able to define a reduced 
form equation from which market power can be inferred 
without being able to identify separately the parameters 
of the inverse residual demand function and the first-
order conditions.  The form of the equation for the 
United States is as follows:
  
(1)
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where  pt
u is the price (unit value) of US wheat exported 
to Japan in Yen, Qt
u is the quantity of US wheat 
exported to Japan, Wt
i  is the vector of cost shifting 
variables for export competitor i ( ia c   , ),  Zt  is a 
vector of demand shift variables in Japan, K
u is the 
elasticity of the residual inverse demand function, E is 
the coefficient vector for the cost shift variables for the 
main competitors, Canada and Australia, and J  is the 
coefficient vector of demand shifters for the destination 
market, Japan.  The equations for Canada and Australia 
are similar.  The subscript t stands for time, and H  is the 
error term.  The cost shifters include measures of input 
prices as well as exchange rates.  The demand shifters 
consist of real income in the destination market.  Given 
the double logarithmic functional form, it is possible to 
separate the shift variables into two components, namely, 
their values in domestic currency and the exchange rate 
between each country’s currency and the Yen (see 
Goldberg and Knetter [1999, p. 41]).  This procedure 
allows the exchange rates to act as cost shifters which 
display considerable variation over the sample period.   
The export volume of each exporting country to Japan is 
an endogenous variable. The instrument proposed by 
Goldberg and Knetter [1999, p. 41] is the exchange rate 
between the exporting country’s currency and the 
importing country’s currency. 
The data used in this study cover 88 quarterly 
observations over the 1970-1991 time period.  The US 
unit values and export quantities are based on the 
monthly  Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 
data.  Canadian data were obtained from Statistics 
Canada, International Trade Division and from the 
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange.  The Australian data 
came from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and Wool 
International.  Real GDP data were obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics ( IFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund.  The exchange rates were 
obtained from the USDA data base to be found at 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/mor_start.html.
2  
The method of two-stage least squares was used to 
estimate equation (1).  The residual inverse demand 
elasticity for the United States is reported as the 
coefficient of the right-hand side variable, LOGUSQ 
(Table 1).  The absolute value of the coefficient, which is 
significantly different from zero and with the expected 
sign, approximates the mark-up over marginal cost.  It 
implies a residual demand elasticity of 1.08 ( 10 9 3 /. ), 
in absolute value.  Thus, the conjecture that the US has a 
horizontal residual inverse demand function is rejected 
and with it, the conjecture of competitive behavior by that 
exporting country. 
The results for Canadian wheat exports to Japan are 
presented in Table 2.  The dependent variable is the log-
price of Canadian wheat to Japan (in Yen).  The set of 
cost and demand shifters include the same variables as 
for the US equation but replacing the variables for the 
United States with those from Canada.  The set of 
instruments was selected in a similar way.  The results of 
this estimation imply that there is no significant mark-up 
over marginal cost for Canadian wheat, although the 
coefficient has the correct expected sign.  All of the other 
right-hand side variables were statistically significant, 
except for the Australian exchange rate against the 
Japanese Yen.  In other words, Japanese expenditure on 
wheat and the US exchange rate against Japanese Yen, as 
well as the production cost indices for the United States 
and Australia have explanatory power regarding the price 
of Canadian wheat exported to Japan.  This result is 
consistent with Canada being a price taker because 
changes in the Canadian export price do not vary with 
export volume but with changes in the costs of 
competitors and shifts in Japanese import demand. 
The results of the residual demand elasticity 
estimation for Australian wheat are presented in Table 3.  
The set of cost and demand shifters is formed as before 
and the set of instruments is also similar, except that the 
equation includes the first lags of the log-price and log-
quantity of the Australian wheat exports to Japan because 
of serial correlation in the originally specified equation.  
The coefficient of primary interest, LOGAQ, has the 
correct sign but it is not significantly different from zero.  
This can be interpreted as no evidence of mark-up over 
marginal cost for Australian wheat exported to Japan.   
                                                 
2 The model was also estimated using various other 
specifications that included labor cost indices, producer 
price indices and wholesale price indices, in addition to 
the above variables.  The parameters for these variables 
were statistically insignificant, and they were dropped 
from the final specification. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Japanese expenditure on wheat has the expected sign and 
is significantly different from zero.  The production cost 
index for the United States is the other significant 
explanatory variables.  The US and Canadian exchange 
rates against the Japanese Yen do not have any 
explanatory power.  Hence, there is weak evidence that 
Australia is a price taker in the Japanese market. 
It was argued above that the residual demand 
elasticity can be viewed as a measure of the degree of 
competition and, under certain forms of imperfect 
competition, can be related directly to the Lerner Index.  
One of these forms is price leadership.  Our results 
indicate that the United States is possibly a price leader 
in the Japanese market for imported wheat whereas 
Australia and Canada form a competitive fringe.  This 
finding allows us to eliminate the alternatives of Cournot 
or Bertrand competition because there is only one country 
with any evidence of market power.  But there is another 
possibility, namely, that there is monopsony power, 
where Japan exerts some market power in the 
international wheat markets (Love and Murniningtyas 
[1992]).  Therefore, in the second stage of our analysis, 
we focus on three alternative market structures, namely, 
competitive pricing, monopsony, and US price leadership 
with a competitive fringe. 
III.  LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS FOR MODEL 
SELECTION 
Now that the number of relevant models has been 
narrowed down, the approach taken in this section is to 
derive and estimate a structural econometric model 
associated with each of these three market structures for 
the six endogenous variables, which are quantities and 
prices for the three competing exporting countries.  Each 
market structure investigated is nested in a general linear 
model through the use of cross-equation restrictions.
3  
III(i).  The Competitive Model 
Let the inverse demand function facing the i
th exporting 
country be 
(2)
 
pq p y i u c a i j ii i i i i j j j i  ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ˙ JG G J 01 ,, , ,        
  
where  pi is the price of country i’s exports in the 
importing country’s currency, qi is the quantity exported 
by country i,  y is the total expenditure on imported 
wheat by Japan.  The supply functions are defined as 
                                                 
3  See Carter and MacLaren [1997] for more detail. 
(3)  pq P P ii i i i i  ￿￿ TT T 01 2  
where PP i is a proxy for input prices in Japanese Yen in 
exporting country i, measured in terms of the 
opportunity cost of growing alternative crops.  This proxy 
is the price of corn in the US case, that of canola for 
Canada, and that of wool for Australia. 
For each country, it is assumed that the exporting 
firm (wheat boards for the Canadian and Australian 
cases) maximizes profits from export sales only, i.e., the 
domestic market is ignored.  Letting , 3iii TR TC  ￿ , 
the associated first-order condition is 
(4)  pq P P ii i i i i i i  ￿￿ ￿ TG T T 01 2 () . 
Equations (2) and (4) for each of the exporting countries 
forms a system of six simultaneous equations in six 
endogenous variables, namely, prices and quantities. 
III(ii). The  Monopsony  Model 
Assume now that the Japanese Food Agency acts as a 
monopsonist and that the exporting countries are price 
takers.  Let the Food Agency’s marginal revenue function 
for imports from exporting country i be  
(5)
 
MR q p y i u c a i j ii i i i i j j j i  ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ˙ JG GJ 01 2, , , ,        
  
where the notation is as before.  
The average outlay function for wheat from each of 
the exporting countries is the same as in Equation (3).  
Defining the maximization problem as, max 
3iii TR TO  ￿, the associated first-order condition is 
(6)
 
pq p y i u c a i i ii i i ij j j i  ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ˙ JG T GJ 01 1 2 () , , , ,          
  
The average outlay function (Equation (3)) and the first-
order condition (Equation (6)) now define the model for 
estimation. 
III(iii).  The US Price Leadership Model 
Let the inverse demand function facing the i
th exporter 
be the same as in Equation (2).  With unit costs, 
cP P ii i  T , firms maximize 3iii TR TC  ￿  under US 
price leadership, where TC PPq ii i i  T .  The associated 
first-order condition for the United States will be 
(7)
  pq P P uu u u c c u u a a u u u u  ￿￿ ￿ GG G G G T 1 16
,  
and that for Canada and for Australia will be 
(8)  pP P j c a jj j    T ,,     . IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Equations (2), (7) and (8) form a system of six 
simultaneous equations in six endogenous variables, 
namely, prices and quantities. 
III(iv).  Methodology for Empirical Analysis 
Since the models derived above are non-nested with 
respect to each other, the statistical testing of each type of 
market structure requires the use of a test for non-nested 
models.  Such a test, to provide pair-wise comparisons 
among different non-nested alternatives, has been 
constructed by Vuong [1989].  It should be emphasized 
that the validity of the test is not dependent upon one of 
the models in the pair being the correct model.  The 
procedure begins with the estimation of the demand 
equations (supply equations for the monopsony case) and 
the first-order conditions jointly by the full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) method.  The FIML 
parameter estimates are not presented here, since the 
magnitude and the signs of the parameters do not 
contribute to our analysis.  Nevertheless, most of the 
parameters have the expected signs even without any 
sign restrictions on the models. 
The second step in the procedure is to calculate the 
likelihood ratio, as () LL fg ￿ , for each of the three 
pairs of comparisons, (,) MM fg , and then to 
normalize this difference by 
(9)  nw u u u u nf t f f t g t g g t
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where  Ls is the log likelihood, and ￿ us and  ￿ 6s are the 
estimated residuals and covariance matrix for model 
Ms,  sf g   , .  Under the null hypothesis that each 
model fits the data equally well, the normalized LR is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variable.  
The decision rules for the test are: first, if the absolute 
value of the normalized LR statistic is less than the 
appropriate critical standard normal value, at some level 
of significance, then it is not possible to discriminate 
between the two models; and second, if the test statistic is 
less (greater) than the appropriate negative (positive) 
critical value, then it is concluded that model Mg (M f ) 
is significantly better.  The results of this approach are 
reported in Table 4.  The LR statistic for the comparison 
between the competitive model and the US price 
leadership model is 37.55, which is significant at the 1 
percent level.  Since it is positive, it can be concluded 
that the competitive model is significantly better than the 
US price leadership model.  The pair-wise comparison 
between the monopsony model and the US price 
leadership model provides a standardized LR statistic of 
27.60, which is also significant at the 1 percent level.  
Hence, the monopsony model is closer to the true data 
generating process than the US price leadership model.  
The  LR statistic for the comparison between the 
competitive model and the monopsony model is 1.16.   
Since this value is not statistically significant, it means 
that we cannot discriminate between the competitive and 
monopsony models. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The competitive structure of the international wheat 
market has been a much investigated issue.  Yet despite 
the substantial amount of research, the definitive answer 
remains elusive.  Some results have supported imperfect 
competition amongst the exporting countries with price-
taking behavior amongst the importing countries: other 
results have supported monopsonistic behavior by 
individual importing countries and price-taking behavior 
amongst exporting countries.  Clearly, both cannot be 
correct.  The issue remains: given that there are 
exporting countries without capacity constraints on 
supply and relative freedom of entry to and exit from the 
market, then prices should be close to marginal cost in 
the absence of market power, i.e., there should be very 
little relative mark-up. 
In this paper, we have employed two approaches.   
The first approach is based on estimating the residual 
inverse demand function facing each of the three 
exporting countries (Australia, Canada and the US) that 
ship wheat to Japan, which is treated as a segment of the 
international wheat market.  This approach permits an 
estimate of the relative mark-up.  The second approach is 
based on a series of non-nested tests derived from the 
estimation of a linear model within which each market 
structure is nested.  The three alternative market 
structures investigated were competitive pricing, 
monopsony and price leadership by the US 
The results generated from the first approach support 
the proposition that the import market for wheat in Japan 
is imperfectly competitive on the export side.  In 
particular, the results indicate that there is price 
leadership by the US and that Australia and Canada form 
a competitive, or price-taking, fringe.  The results 
generated in the second approach suggest that price 
leadership by the US is inconsistent with the data when 
alternative market structures are evaluated.  Overall, our 
findings suggest that we cannot rule out the competitive 
model. 
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TABLE 1 — Residual Demand Elasticity Calculation for the US Wheat 
Dependent  Variable :  LOGUSPJ 
Method :  Two-Stage  Least  Squares 
Number of Observations  :  86 
Instrument List  :  LOGJEJ, LOGNXAJ, LOGNXCJ, LOGAPP, LOGCPP, 
     LOGNXJ, LOGUSPP 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
 C  11.55 3.08 
 LOGUSQ  -0.93 -3.03 
 LOGJEJ  1.04 6.53 
 LOGNXAJ  -0.20 -1.34 
 LOGNXCJ  0.23 0.90 
 LOGAPP  -0.00 -0.02 
 LOGCPP  0.07 0.71 
 
 R-squared  =  0.88 
 Adjusted  R-squared  =  0.87 
 F-statistic  =  101.28 
 Durbin-Watson  statistic  =  1.97 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 — Residual Demand Elasticity Calculation for the Canadian Wheat 
Dependent  Variable :  LOGCPJ 
Method  :  Two-Stage Least Squares  
Number of Observations  :  88 
Instrument List  :  LOGJEJ, LOGNXAJ, LOGNXJ, LOGAPP, LOGCPP, 
     LOGNXCJ, LOGCPP 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
 C  5.87 1.28 
 LOGCQ  -0.49 -1.29 
 LOGJEJ  0.49 3.61 
 LOGNXAJ  -0.02 -0.21 
 LOGNXJ  0.47 2.10 
 LOGAPP  0.12 2.16 
 LOGUSPP  0.43 3.29 
 
 R-squared  =  0.85 
 Adjusted  R-squared  =  0.84 
 F-statistic  =  80.32 
 Durbin-Watson  statistic  =  1.90 
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TABLE 3 — Residual Demand Elasticity Calculation for the Australian Wheat 
Dependent  Variable :  LOGAPJ 
Method :  Two-Stage Least  Squares 
Number of Observations : 85 (after adjusting endpoints) 
Instrument List : LOGJEJ, LOGNXCJ, LOGNXJ, LOGCPP, LOGUSPP,   LOGNXAJ, 
LOGAPP, LOGAPJ(-1), LOGAQ(-1) 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
 C  3.83 2.75 
 LOGAQ  -0.08 -0.87 
 LOGJEJ  0.30 3.91 
 LOGNXCJ -0.22 -0.62 
 LOGNXJ 0.12 0.30 
 LOGCPP 0.10 0.58 
 LOGUSPP 0.43 2.45 
 AR(1) 0.33 2.88 
 
 R-squared  = 0.83 
 Adjusted R-squared  = 0.82 
 F-statistic =  54.31 
 Durbin-Watson statistic =  2.16 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 — Adjusted LR Statistics for Model Selection 
 M 1  M2  M3 
M1   1.16
  37.55
 + 
M2  -1.16  27.60
 + 
M3  -37.55
 + -27.60
 + 
 
 
Notes: M1: Competitive model, M2: Monopsony model; M3: US price leadership model  
 
+ Significant at the 1 percent level in both a one-sided and a two-sided test. 
 